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This article is based on the following hypothetical:
After several years of successful association between GROWFAST Inc.
(a Delaware corporation) with its principle place of business in Kansas,
* Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law
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and AGRICOLAS S.A. de C.V., a serious accident occurred at the
AGRICOLAS plant in Monterrey. While transferring SollateTM concentrate
into vats for dilution and packaging, supervised by both AGRICOLAS
employees and two technicians "on loan" from GROWFAST, an unex-
plained explosion occurred. Three supervisory persons and 35 other em-
ployees were killed. Serious injury was caused to dozens of other employees.
The chemical laden smoke from the explosion drifted over parts of
Monterrey and adjacent towns. By the time it had dissipated, it had
caused serious burns to several hundred more people, including a number
of foreigners. The foreigners included two United States citizens vaca-
tioning in Mexico. Lawsuits are being considered by Mexicans, the two
United States citizens, and four Europeans.
I. REPRESENTING POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS
A. Initial Thoughts as to Where to File Lawsuits
1. Identify the clients
First, the lawyer must know who the clients are. The lawyer who
represents only U.S. citizens will plan the litigation differently from the
lawyer who represents the Mexican nationals and the Europeans instead
of, or in addition to, the U.S. Citizens.
If the lawyer now represents only one or a few persons, the lawyer
should explore the possibility of expanding the client base to include
everyone who was injured. This would make the lawsuit more efficient,
allowing more thorough representation because the costs would be shared
among more clients and the greater judgment available with multiple
plaintiffs might justify higher expenditures for investigation, planning,
legal research and hiring of expert witnesses.
The question of obtaining more clients raises an ethics question which
also involves an issue of conflict of laws: Which rules of ethics would
control the conduct of an U.S. lawyer seeking to obtain clients in Mexico?
Is the lawyer subject to the ethical constraints imposed on lawyers in
Mexico, the law of the U.S. state in which the lawyer is licensed to
practice or both when the U.S. lawyer solicits clients in another jurisdiction
or country?
The lawyer might consider choosing a forum for the litigation in part
based upon which forums provide for class actions and have rules making
class actions relatively easy to use.'
2. Issues to Consider in Choosing Forum of Litigation
The U.S. lawyer who lacks knowledge of the jurisdictional and sub-
stantive laws of Mexico must first learn the rudiments of Mexican law,
1. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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perhaps by consulting the Martindale-Hubble synopsis of the law of
Mexico 2 and then asking a law librarian for additional general sources,
in English, on the laws of Mexico.' A review only of library sources
almost certainly would not suffice. After becoming familiar with the
basic principles of Mexican law, the U.S. lawyer would want to retain
a lawyer who practices law in Mexico to provide a detailed evaluation
of relevant Mexican law.
The U.S. lawyer typically would begin analysis by determining the
maximum number of forums that would be available in which to bring
the lawsuit. For an U.S. lawyer, the forum- availability question requires
consideration of the following: 1) Jurisdiction of the subject matter; 2)
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant(s); 3) Proper venue; and
4) Problems of service of process.
The lawyer would survey the law of every state of the United States
that had any connection with the transactions or the potential defendants
to see how many of them could meet the four requirements and qualify
as proper forums for the litigation. The lawyer would analyze separately
whether United States federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the case.
Finally, the lawyer would ask the consulting Mexican attorney to do the
equivalent analysis to determine the maximum number of forums in
Mexico in which the lawsuit could be brought.
Consideration of possible forums includes not only an analysis of the
place where the plaintiffs can obtain jurisdiction, but also whether the
defendant would be able to veto the plaintiffs' choice of any of these
available forums through the use of procedural rules allowing defendants
to dismiss or move a case brought by plaintiffs in any of these forums.
These "defendant-veto" procedures include: 1) Motion for change of
venue; 4 2) Motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens;5 and 3) Removal
of the action to federal court if the lawsuit is brought in a state court.
6
At this point, the goal is simply to identify all the places where the
action could be brought and where the defendant could not frustrate the
plaintiff's choice of forum. After the lawyer determines the number of
possibilities, the lawyer would then proceed to choose from among the
many possibilities the one forum which provides the greatest tactical
advantages to the client. For the reasons described below, state and
federal courts in Texas, Kansas and Delaware probably have jurisdiction
to hear an action against GrowFast filed on behalf of the injured persons
and the estates of the person killed in the accident in Mexico.
2. MARTINDALE-HUBBLE INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, Mex. 1-18 (1995).
3. E.g., 1 THOMAS H. REYNOLDS AND ARTURO FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF
CODES AND BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD, I Mex. 1-37 (1994); FRANCISCO
AVALOS, THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1992).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (1993).
5. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1994).
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a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
i. State Courts
An action for personal injuries based on tort is a "transitory" cause
of action which means that it can brought in the courts of any state
where personal jurisdiction over the defendant(s) exists and venue is
proper and valid service of process can be accomplished.' Thus, in each
of the fifty states there is a court that has subject matter jurisdiction
to hear this tort case.
ii. Federal Courts
Unlike state courts, federal courts have only limited subject matter
jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction exists only if 1) the United States Con-
stitution authorizes federal jurisdiction, and 2) Congress passes a statute
affirmatively granting the federal court the power which the Constitution
authorizes .8
In this case, the likely source of jurisdiction is "diversity" jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332. This federal statute authorizes federal
courts to hear cases even when state law, rather than federal law provides
the basis for the claim so long as all of the plaintiffs are citizens of
U.S. states which are different from the home states of all of the
defendants and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. 9 The statute
sets forth rules for determining the citizenship of a U.S. corporation
such as GrowFast.' 0 GrowFast is a citizen of Delaware because it is
incorporated there" and, apparently, of Kansas because its main offices
are there.'2 If only the U.S. citizens who were injured sued GrowFast
in federal court, there would be diversity jurisdiction so long as none
of them is a citizen of Delaware or Kansas.
When foreign nationals are suing or being sued in federal court, the
statute provides a different test for determining diversity: There is diversity
if the law suit "is between. . .citizens of a State and citizens or subjects
of a foreign state."' 3 This provision means that if the Mexican nationals
injured in Mexico sued in a United States federal district court against
GrowFast, there would be federal diversity jurisdiction so long as the
amount in controversy exceeded the $50,000 minimum set by statute.' 4
7. E.g., Lutheran Brotherhood v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 829 S.W.2d 300, 307 (Tex. Ct.
App.), vacated, 840 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1992).
8. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (a)(1) (1993).
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c)(1) (1993).
11. Id.
12. In addition to being a citizen of the state of incorporation, a corporation is also a citizen
"of the State where it has its principal place of business .. " Id.
13. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2) (1993).
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (1993).
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The diversity statute contains another relevant provision. When United
States citizens and foreign subjects come together to sue a United States
company there is federal diversity jurisdiction so long as none of the
U.S. plaintiffs is a citizen of the same state as any of the U.S. defendants.' 5
This provision would allow for federal court subject matter jurisdiction
of an action by the two U.S. plaintiffs, the Mexican nationals and the
four Europeans against GrowFast so long as neither U.S. plaintiff is a
citizen of Delaware or Kansas, the states of citizenship of GrowFast.'
6
The result is that there is subject matter jurisdiction over the proposed
action in all the state courts of the United States and also in all of the
federal district courts of the United States.
b. Personal Jurisdiction
Even when a court has subject matter jurisdiction because it has the
power to hear a particular type of case, the court must also have a
sufficiently close relationship with each defendant to make it "fair" that
the defendant be forced to defend in that court and be bound by the
court's ruling. This is the requirement of "personal jurisdiction" over
the defendant. The outer limits of personal jurisdiction are set by the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 7 which courts
construe as requiring that defendant have "sufficient minimum contacts"
with the forum state so that the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
will not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"'
When the federal court asserts diversity subject matter jurisdiction, the
federal court applies the same rules for personal jurisdiction as the state
in which the federal court is located.' 9 Thus, the federal court sitting in
any state court that has jurisdiction over the person of GrowFast also
has personal jurisdiction over GrowFast.
The specific rules of personal jurisdiction are complicated and vary
from state to state. No attempt to provide a full summary is made here. 20
Suffice it to say that the facts presented in this problem do not demonstrate
that Agricolas has sufficient contacts with any U.S. state to justify the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Agricolas in any state or federal
court of the United States. There is no indication that Agricolas conducted
any purposeful activities in the United States. Therefore, unless Agricolas
waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, 2' Agricolas probably
cannot be sued in any U.S. court.
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(3) (1993).
16. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 154 F.R.D. 164, 168-69 (W.D. Mich.
1994) (the American plaintiffs must be diverse from the American defendants, and if they are,
aliens may be added on either side of the litigation).
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940).
19. E.g., Reliable Tool & Mach. Co., v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 837 F.Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. Ind.
1993); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(A).
20. See ROBERT CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL AcTIONS (2d ed. 1991).
21. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person can be waived by a defendant through
1996]
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GrowFast, however, has sufficient contacts with several U.S. states to
subject GrowFast to personal jurisdiction in their courts for the injuries
occurring in Mexico as a result of the explosion in Mexico:
Delaware is the state of incorporation of GrowFast. A corporation is
subject to jurisdiction in the state of its incorporation for any cause of
action, even if the corporation's business activities are largely conducted
elsewhere and even if the cause of action arises outside the state of
incorporation. 2 Because GrowFast was incorporated in Delaware it may
be sued in the courts of Delaware. 23
Kansas is the state in which the principal administrative offices of
GrowFast are located. A corporation which is "doing business" in Kansas
is subject to jurisdiction on any claim, even one that arises out of conduct
done somewhere other than in Kansas.u A corporation is doing business
in Kansas if it has "an office or place of business within this state...,,22
and the corporation's activities are "permanent, continuous, and regu-
lar. ''26
Texas is the state in which GrowFast operates a pesticide plant. Texas
state courts probably have personal jurisdiction over GrowFast based on
the operation of the factory in Texas, whether or not the SollateTM was
manufactured at the Texas factory. The hypothetical problem does not
state whether the SollateTM that blew up in Mexico was manufactured
in the Texas plant. If it was, this would make finding personal jurisdiction
in Texas relatively easy. 27 Even if the SollateTM was not manufactured
in the Texas plant, a Texas state court would have jurisdiction if the
operation of the Texas plant by GrowFast constituted "doing business"
in Texas: "[Jlurisdiction may be asserted when the cause of action does
not arise from or relate to the nonresident defendant's purposeful conduct
within the forum state but there are continuous and systematic contacts
between the nonresident defendant and the forum state. ' 28
c. Venue
Venue statutes establish the location within a government's geographical
area at which the lawsuit can be brought if there is jurisdiction over the
subject and the person within that government's courts.29 For example,
consent to jurisdiction, e.g., Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), or by
failure to raise the issue in time fashion as required by the rules of procedure. E.g., FED. R. CrV.
P. 12 (h)(1).
22. 1 ROBERT CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIvIL ACTIONS § 3.0211], at 3-130 (2d ed. 1991).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(2) (1991).
24. Scrivner v. Twin Americas Agric. and Indus. Developers, Inc., 573 P.2d 614 (Kan. Ct. App.
1977).
25. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7303 (1988).
26. Woodmont Corp. v. Rockwood Ctr. Partnership, 852 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Kan. 1994).
27. Project Eng'g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (when
the lawsuit arises out of conduct done by the defendant in Texas, it is easier to satisfy personal
jurisdiction requirements than it would be if the conduct did not arise out of Texas activities).
28. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223,
228 (Tex. 1991).
29. "Venue... means the place of trial in an action within a state." George Stevens, Venue
Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307-08 (1951).
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Texas venue statutes might inform a litigant whether to bring the law
suit in Dallas, Houston or San Antonio, assuming that there is subject
matter and personal jurisdiction in the state courts of Texas.30 Federal
venue statutes similarly set the location of the federal courts in which
the action may be brought. Federal venue statutes will permit the plaintiffs
to sue GrowFast in federal courts in Delaware, Kansas, or Texas.3 Thus,
the venue statutes will not pose a barrier to suit in any of the forums,
state or federal, that have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
person in this case.
d. Service of Process
Wherever they sue, the plaintiffs will have to provide the defendant,
GrowFast, with a copy of the summons and the complaint when they
institute suit.12 Under some circumstances service must take place only
within the boundaries of the state in which the suit is brought.33 Most
often, the place of service is not relevant."
In the GrowFast hypothetical, there are no geographical limitations on
service in the federal or state courts in Kansas, Delaware and Texas in
which the plaintiffs would consider suing.
e. The "Internal Law" of each Forum that has Jurisdiction
U.S. state courts have a tendency to apply the law of their own state
to resolve problems having interstate or international connections.' Ob-
viously, then, it is important to determine the relevant law of each of
the U.S. states that has some significant connection to this problem.
Counsel would limit the research to a determination of the law of each
state that has personal jurisdiction over GrowFast because it is highly
likely that if U.S. law is to apply to the problem, the law of one of
the states that has jurisdiction over GrowFast will apply. 6 There are
innumerable legal issues relevant to this problem. A non- exhaustive list
includes:
- Does the jurisdiction have strict products liability as a theory of
recovery as well as negligence?
30. See TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 15 (West 1986).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1993) (venue proper in any federal court located in a state that
would have personal jurisdiction over GrowFast).
32. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
33. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin Co., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
34. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e).
35. For example, one leading theorist of choice of law was Professor Brainerd Currie. See, e.g.,
Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L. J. 171.
A leading treatise notes that "Currie's analysis will always lead to forum law except in those cases
in which the policy of the forum does not call for the application of its law, that is where it is
'disinterested."' EUGENE SCOLES AND PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.6, at 18 (2d ed. 1992).
36. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224-25 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I recognize
that the jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiries are not identical .... [but] both inquiries are
'often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations."' (quoting
Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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- Does the jurisdiction provide liberal damages recovery for wrongful
death?
- Does the jurisdiction have a law permitting recovery for emotional
distress and pain and suffering as well as medical expenses and lost
wages?
- Does the jurisdiction permit injured workers both to collect for
Workers' Compensation against the employer and also to sue a com-
pany other than its own employer for negligence or products liability?
- Does the jurisdiction provide that every wrongdoer is responsible
for all of the plaintiffs' damages or does it provide that the plaintiffs
can recover from any one defendant only the percentage of damages
that correspond to that defendant's percentage of fault?
It is unlikely that a separate body of U.S. federal law concerning
products liability, damages or wrongful death recovery would apply in
tLis case. Although the federal government has the power to write national
laws on these subjects," it has not done so. 8 Instead, state laws concerning
wrongful death, torts and damages are likely to apply, even if the action
is brought in the federal court based on diversity subject matter juris-
diction. 9
Counsel would ask the Mexican consulting attorney to do the same
analysis of applicable rules of law for each Mexican court that had
jurisdiction.
f. The Choice of Law Rules of each Forum that has Jurisdiction
It is not enough to know the substantive law of the U.S. states with
jurisdiction. Although states have a tendency to apply their own sub-
stantive law, they do not always do so. Each U.S. state has a body of
rules or a system of analysis for determining when its court will apply
its own laws and when, instead, it will apply the laws of another state
or foreign country. This body of rules is called the "choice of law"
system of the forum. Within bounds set by the United States Consti-
tution, 40 each state is free to adopt whatever system it wants for resolving
the question of when to apply its own internal law and when to apply
the law of a different state or a foreign country. Thus, each state might
have different rules for choosing between U.S. and Mexican law and for
choosing which state's law to apply if U.S. law is chosen.
This choice of law question is of critical importance because it can
result in one state, which has jurisdiction, choosing to apply Mexican
law under that forum's choice of law system while the court of a different
state with jurisdiction could have a different set of choice of law rules
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 and ci. 18.
38. Congress is currently considering federal legislation that would create nation-wide law for
some aspects of products liability litigation. See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, As Clinton Vows to
Veto Products-Liability Bill, Some Ask if He's Too Beholden to Trial Lawyers, WALL ST. J., March
22, 1996, at A14.
39. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
40. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § I; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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that led it to apply its own internal law in preference to that of Mexico.
Still a third state with jurisdiction might choose to apply neither its own
law nor Mexican law, but, instead, the law of a different state.
The existence of different choice of law systems for different states
adds a new level of complexity in forum selection. In addition to de-
termining which courts have jurisdiction and which court with jurisdiction
has the most favorable law, the plaintiffs' lawyer must also consider the
choice of law system of each court with jurisdiction. Throughout this
analysis, the goal of plaintiff's counsel is to find a court that has
jurisdiction which has a choice of law system that will direct it to apply
the substantive law of the state whose law is most favorable to the
plaintiffs.
g. Procedural Advantages of Each Forum that has Jurisdiction
If several courts have jurisdiction and each has a choice of law system
that directs the court to apply favorable substantive law, counsel might
choose where to sue based upon consideration of which forum has
procedural rules most favorable to the plaintiffs. The procedural rules
of each state can differ significantly, so that there may be important
procedural advantages in one forum that are absent in another.
The search for favorable procedural law is simplified by a basic prop-
osition of U.S. choice of law. The forum almost always applies its own
procedural rules. 41 This is so even when the forum's choice of law rules
direct it to apply the substantive law of another state. Thus, if the suit
is brought in Texas state court, Texas procedure rules will apply even
if the Texas court chooses to apply Mexican tort law or the Delaware
wrongful death statute.42 So too, if suit is brought in any United States
federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply even though
the state law of torts or wrongful death will apply.43
Procedural differences that may produce the most favorable procedural
system for the litigation might depend on the resolution of the following
questions: Is there a right to a jury in the forum? Is the pool of available
jurors in a particular forum likely to be favorably disposed to the
plaintiffs? Which forum has rules allowing the broadest pre- trial dis-
covery? Which forum has the most liberal rules of joinder, including a
rule authorizing class actions? What is the scope of the subpoena power
of this jurisdiction? Can witnesses from other jurisdictions be subpoenaed
to appear in this forum?
h. Enforceability of Judgments
It would be most unfortunate for a plaintiff to sue in a forum which
has jurisdiction, has a choice of law system that directs it to apply
41. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 585 (1934). Exceptions exist. See, e.g., RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §
133 (1971) (burden of proof).
42. E.g., Paine v. Moore, 464 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).
43. E.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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favorable substantive law, and has procedural advantages for the clients
if the resulting judgment of that court would not be enforceable.
If GrowFast is to be the sole defendant, enforceability is not a significant
problem if the lawsuit is brought in a court in the United States. The
United States Constitution requires that every state give "full faith and
credit" to the judgments of every other state. 44 A federal statute imple-
menting this constitutional requirement provides that, generally, once a
judgment is entered in the court of one U.S. state, every other U.S.
state asked to do so shall enforce that judgment against any assets of
the judgment debtor which are present in the state asked to enforce the
judgment.45 Full Faith and Credit is given by federal courts" and received
by federal courts as well. 47
As a result, whether this case is brought in a federal or state court
in Kansas, Delaware. or Texas, any judgment obtaincd almost certainly
will be enforced against GrowFast's assets anywhere in the United States.
Because GrowFast is an U.S. corporation with most of its assets in the
United States, there should be no trouble enforcing a judgment of a
U.S. court against GrowFast.
If GrowFast had sufficient assets located in Mexico to pay the large
judgment plaintiffs seek, a judgment against Growfast in a Mexican court
presumably could be enforced in Mexico without the need to consider
whether U.S. courts would enforce the Mexican judgment. Problems of
judgment enforcement might make Mexico's courts a poor choice of
forum for the plaintiff, however, if GrowFast's assets are mostly located
in the United States.
Foreign country judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit in
U.S. courts because the Constitution compels U.S. courts to give full
faith and credit only to judgment of U.S. courts.48 The right to mandatory
enforcement of a Mexican judgment in courts in the United States could
be established by treaty between Mexico and the United States but there
is no such treaty.49 Absent a treaty, each state is free to choose its own
rules to determine the level of deference to be given to a judgment of
a foreign country which is sought to be enforced in that state's court.
Some states follow the common law rule of "comity" which provides
for discretionary deference to foreign country judgments but provides
great flexibility to decline to enforce the judgments.5 0 More than half
44. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, §1
45. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1994).
46. E.g., Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 736
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).
47. See Bennun v. Bd. of Governors of Rutgers, 413 F.Supp. 1274 (D. N.J. 1976).
48. E.g., Tonga Air Services, Ltd. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204 (Wash. 1992).
49. See Rendering and Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Mexico and the United States: A Panel
Discussion, 2 U.S.- MExico L.J. 91, 96-97 (1994).
50. "In general, the principle of 'comity' is that the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give
effect to the. . .judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation,
but out of deference and mutual respect." Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1977); see generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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the states voluntarily have adopted the Uniform Foreign Country Money-
Judgment Recognition Act which requires deference to foreign country
judgments but provides several situations in which the judgment will not
or need not be enforced.51
B. Impact of Use of a Subsidiary Corporation by GrowFast
If GrowFast had chosen to distribute SollateTM in Mexico using a
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary or a wholly-owned Mexican subsidiary of
GrowFast this would not affect the analysis of the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts over GrowFast. The issues of subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction and venue in U.S. courts are not dependent upon whether
GrowFast acted in Mexico directly, indirectly or through an independent
agent. Rather, the jurisdictional focus is on GrowFast's connections with
the states in the United States in which plaintiffs might seek to assert
jurisdiction.
Whether Mexican courts have jurisdiction over GrowFast might vary
depending upon the manner in which GrowFast chose to operate in
Mexico. That would be a matter for resolution in accordance with the
laws of Mexico.
For the purpose of determining liability rather than jurisdiction, the
manner of distribution of SollateT could have some impact under U.S.
law. The hypothetical problem states that the explosion occurred during
packaging and dilution of SollateTM which was being supervised by "both
Agricolas employees and two technicians 'on loan' from GrowFast." If
the explosion occurred because of the wrongdoing of the supervisors in
Mexico rather than because of any defect in the product when it was
made in Texas, the liability of GrowFast might depend in part upon the
manner of distribution of the product.
Whatever the distribution system, GrowFast normally would be liable
for the wrongdoing of its own employees under the principle of "res-
pondeat superior."5 2 There is a possible exception known as the "borrowed
servant doctrine" which might apply to the GrowFast employees "loaned"
to Agricolas, thereby excusing GrowFast from liability for the torts of
the GrowFast employees.3 A choice of law question could arise as to
whether the law of Mexico or that of a U.S. state would apply to
determine the vicarious liability of GrowFast for the wrongdoing if its
servants were on loan to Agricolas and working in Mexico at the time
of the explosion.54
51. See UmoFRM FoREIoN MONEY-JUDGMiNTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986); 13 U.L.A.
63 (1995 Supp.) (list of jurisdictions adopting Act).
52. "[Ulnder the doctrine of respondeat superior, master and servant are one and the same.
The principal is liable for the act of his servant or agent performed within the scope of employment.
It is derivative liability." White v. Dennison, 752 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
53. See, e.g., 53 Am. Jus. 2d Master and Servant § 415 at 425 (1970) (an employer is not
liable for injury negligently caused by a servant if the latter is not at the time in the service of
that employer, but in the special service of another...).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 174 (1971) (Court applies the respondeat
superior law of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the occurrence and to
the parties).
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GrowFast would not be liable for the torts of Agricolas' employees,
however, because most U.S. jurisdictions follow the rule that one who
hires an independent contractor generally is not liable for the torts of
the independent contractor." If, in contrast, Agricolas were a subsidiary
of GrowFast, whether incorporated in the United States or Mexico, there
is a greater chance that GrowFast could be liable for Agricolas' torts,
though most U.S. states follow the rule that protects the parent cor-
poration from liability for torts of subsidiaries absent a compelling reason
to "pierce the corporate veil" of the parent.56 One choice of law question
that would arise is whether the law of a U.S. state or the law of Mexico
would determine the scope of the liability of a U.S. corporation for the
torts of its U.S. or Mexican subsidiaries doing business in Mexico."
If the explosion occurred because of a defect in the product manu-
factured by GrowFast rather than in the manner of its handling in Mexico,
U.S. products liability law might make GrowFast liable for the explosion
and harm no matter how the product was distributed in Mexico. 8 It
would then be unnecessary to consider the issue of liability of GrowFast
for negligence in handling the product at the time of the explosion.
II. LITIGATION IN TEXAS
A. State Court
1. Jurisdiction
The state courts of Texas would have jurisdiction. Texas courts have
subject matter jurisdiction of tort actions wherever the tort might occur. 9
If GrowFast manufactured the defective SollateTM in Texas, personal
jurisdiction over GrowFast in Texas is virtually certain to exist. 6 Even
if the SollateTM was not manufactured in Texas, the presence of a
GrowFast factory in Texas is sufficient to give Texas jurisdiction over
GrowFast: "General jurisdiction may be asserted when the cause of action
does not arise from or relate to the nonresident defendant's purposeful
conduct within the forum state but there are continuous and systematic
contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state." 6'
55. See, e.g., 41 AM. Juin. 2d Independent Contractors § 41 (1970).
56. See, e.g., Trailways, Inc. v. Clark, 794 S.W.2d 479, 489 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (court will
disregard separate nature of subsidiary if subsidiary "is being used as a sham.. .to avoid liability").
57. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 301, 302 (1971) (liability of
corporate entities to third persons).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
59. Lutheran Brotherhood v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 829 S.W.2d 300, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990),
vacated, 840 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1992) ("Tort actions are transitory in nature and can be instituted
and tried in any court which has jurisdiction in personam of the defendant.").
60. See e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Beaver, Oklahoma v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist.,
835 S.W.2d 115, 121 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (Systematic and continuous contacts are not necessarily
required for Texas to exercise jurisdiction . . .if the cause of action arises from, or is connected
with, a purposeful act or transaction done or consummated in Texas.).
61. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 223, 228
(Tex. 1991).
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2. Forum Non Conveniens
"The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is author-
ized . "62 Texas once barred its courts from applying the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to wrongful death and personal injury actions
brought in a Texas court but, in 1993, the Texas legislature adopted a
statute authorizing Texas courts to dismiss such actions on the ground
of forum non conveniens. 63 The current statute permits a Texas state
court to dismiss an action brought by a claimant who is not a legal
resident of the United States whenever the court "finds that in the interest
of justice an action to which this section applies would be more properly
heard in a forum outside [Texas). . . ."64
When a plaintiff is a legal resident of the United States, but not a
resident of Texas, the Texas court also can dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens, but the court must first find that: 1) there is an
alternative forum with jurisdiction; 2) which, after balancing "the private
interests of all the parties and the public interest of the state," is a more
convenient forum for the litigation; 3) which "offers a remedy for the
causes of action brought by a party. . ."; and 4) the act or omission
causing the injury or death did not occur in Texas.65 If the plaintiff is
a legal resident of Texas, a Texas court cannot dismiss the case based
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens."
In short, a Texas state court has the power to dismiss for forum non
conveniens when the plaintiffs are foreign nationals 67 and can do so more
easily than it could if the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens. If the two injured
U.S. citizens in the GrowFast hypothetical are from Texas, however, the
Texas court cannot dismiss their claims on the ground of forum non
conveniens.
These considerations might lead the plaintiffs' lawyer to join in a single
lawsuit the two U.S. citizens with the foreign nationals as co-plaintiffs.
This would decrease the likelihood that the Texas court would dismiss
based on forum non conveniens, but would not assure that the Texas
court would keep the case. The court would be barred from applying
forum non conveniens only if at least one of the joined U.S. citizens is
a resident of Texas.6
62. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
63. TEx. Crv. PaRAc. & REm. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West Supp. 1996); see Autin v. Daniel Bruce
Marine, Inc., 862 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (explains the history of forum non conveniens
in Texas).
64. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71-051(a) (West Supp. 1996).
65. TEX. Cirv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71-051(b)-(0(2) (West Supp. 1996).
66. TEX. Clv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71-051(f)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
67. One possibility exists that forum non conveniens would not apply to an action brought by
the Mexican nationals. The Texas statute bars dismissal of any action for death or injury which
"resulted from a violation of the laws of this state .. " TEx. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §
71-051(g) (West Supp. 1996). Possibly, plaintiffs could allege and prove a violation of Texas law
in this lawsuit.
68. The statue bars the application ,of forum non conveniens to "an action" whenever "a
claimant in the action who is properly joined is a legal resident of this state." TEx. CIV. PRAc.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 71-051(f)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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B. Federal Court
1. Jurisdiction
A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction of a suit in which foreign
nationals are plaintiffs, a U.S. corporation is a defendant and more than
$50,000 is in controversy. 69 Even if the two U.S. citizens were made co-
plaintiffs, the federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction so
long as the U.S. citizens were not citizens of the same state as GrowFast. 0
Personal jurisdiction over GrowFast in federal court in Texas also exists
because federal courts in diversity actions have personal jurisdiction over
defendants when the state court in which the federal court is sitting
would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant 7I and the Texas state
court does have personal jurisdiction over GrowFast. 7"
2. Forum Non Conveniens
The federal court has the power to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
but whether it would exercise its discretion to do so is not certain: "The
discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the multifariousness
of the factors relevant to its application. . .make uniformity and pre-
dictability of outcome almost impossible." 73
Federal courts apply their own version of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to actions brought in federal court rather than applying the
version of the state in which they sit. 74 The Texas forum non conveniens
statute, 75 therefore, is not relevant to the application of the doctrine in
the Texas federal court.
Federal courts apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens when the
plaintiff's choice of a federal forum is correct but there is another non-
federal forum available where the action could have been brought and
which is a much more convenient place to try the lawsuit. 76 The application
of the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens to this case, if brought
in federal court, depends upon the following:
a. Existence of Available Alternative Forum
The doctrine applies only when there is an alternative forum in which
the action can be brought if the current forum dismisses the action: "In
69. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(3) (1993).
70. Id.; Camper & Nicholson lnt'l, Ltd. v. Blonder Marine & Charter, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 318,
320 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (§ 1332(a)(3) provides a court with federal jurisdiction where aliens are additional
parties to a controversy, so long as a citizen of a different American states is present on each side
of the controversy and there is a legitimate dispute between those American citizens of diverse
citizenship.)
71. E.g., Reliable Tool & Mach. Co. v. U-Haul Int'l Inc., 837 F.Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. Ind.
1993); see FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(l)(A).
72. See supra discussion § II(A)(I).
73. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 989 (1994).
74. Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West Supp. 1996).
76. Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play,
it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable
to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them." ' 7
The defendant, GrowFast, would have to establish that a Mexican court
would have jurisdiction to hear the case against GrowFast as a precon-
dition to getting a forum non conveniens dismissal in the federal court
on the ground that a Mexican court would be more convenient. Because
GrowFast wants the case to be tried in Mexico, GrowFast might stipulate
that it would submit to the jurisdiction of a Mexican court, accept service
of process and even waive any possible defense of the statute of limitations
in order to demonstrate that a Mexican court provides an alternative
forum.
71
That the alternative Mexican forum might apply a body of law less
favorable to the plaintiff than the law that would be applied in the
United States federal court is not a reason to declare that the alternative
forum is not available: "The possibility of a change in substantive law
should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in
the forum non conveniens inquiry."7 9 The foreign forum can be an
available alternative even though it has a justice system which differs
from that of the United States. For example, forum non conveniens can
apply even if the foreign forum does not provide for jury trials.80 To
bar the use of forum non conveniens on this ground, the plaintiff opposing
the motion to dismiss would have to prove that "the remedy provided
by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that
it is no remedy at all ....
b. Burden of proof
Only in rare cases should a federal court apply the doctrine; "unless
the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed.18 2 Where, however, the plaintiff is
not a resident of the United States, the plaintiff's choice of a federal
forum is entitled to less deference than if a U.S. citizen chooses a United
States federal court. 83
c. Balance of Private and Public Factors
The court considers two types of factors in determining whether to
dismiss the case: 1) the private interests of the litigant; and 2) factors
of public interest." Among the private interests, "[i]mportant consid-
77. Id., at 506-507.
78. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F.Supp. 727, 728 (M.D.Pa. 1979), aff'd, 454 U.S.
235 (1981) (defendant stipulated to jurisdiction in Scotland and agreed to waive statute of limitations).
79. Id. at 247.
80. Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991).
81. Id. at 254.
82. Supra note 76 at 508.
83. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 64 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
84. Supra note 76 at 508.
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erations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises,
if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may
also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is ob-
tained. "5
Factors of public interest include the extent to which the forum courts
are crowded with cases, the burdens imposed on local persons to sit as
jurors for cases having little to do with the geographical area, and the
preference for allowing trials of limited public interest to be tried where
the public interest is greatest.8 In addition, "[tihere is an appropriateness,
too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home
with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court
in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law
foreign to itself." 7
The factors are too numerous and the discretion too great to firmly
predict the result that a Texas federal court would reach. However, a
federal court of appeals recently upheld the decision of a federal court
in Texas to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds in which
Mexican nationals sued a U.S. plane manufacturer for wrongful deaths
occurring when the plane crashed in Mexico. 8
III. CHOICE OF LAW IN COURTS IN TEXAS
The federal district court in Texas will resolve the choice of law question
presented in the GrowFast hypothetical by applying the same choice of
law rules as would the state courts of Texas.89
A. Wrongful Death Law
Texas has a wrongful death statute which allows for the possibility
that Texas law might apply even if the death occurs outside of Texas. 9°
That statute, however, contains a choice of law directive: "The court
shall apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate under the
facts of the case." 9' The courts construe this statute as incorporating
Texas' general approach to choice of law into the analysis of the proper
wrongful death law to apply. 92 The general approach to choice of law
in Texas courts is the "most significant relationship" approach as set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 93 This system
85. Id.
86. Id. at 508-509.
87. Id. at 509.
88. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993).
89. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
90. TEx. Cirv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (West 1986).
91. TEx. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.03(c) (West 1986).
92. Total Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Garcia, 711 S.W.2d 237, 238-39 (Tex. 1986).
93. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
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starts with the presumption that in wrongful death actions the law of
"the state where the injury occur[s]" shall apply.9 To have the law of
another state applied, the proponent of the other law must establish that
the "other state has a more significant relationship" in accordance with
general principles set forth elsewhere in the Restatement. 9
This "significant relationship" approach is notoriously vague, and it
is normally difficult to predict the outcome if there is no directly relevant
precedent in the jurisdiction. Texas courts have considered the wrongful
death/choice of law issue in several cases. Those cases demonstrate Texas
state courts and the federal courts sitting in Texas probably would apply
the law of Mexico concerning wrongful death to all of the foreign nationals
and possibly to the two U.S. citizens as well. Courts applying the Texas
choice of law system have concluded that Texas would apply the law of
the place of injury and death even when that meant applying the law
of another state or country in preference to the law of Texas.9
A recent Texas case, Trailways, Inc. v. Clark,9 contravened this trend
toward the application of the law of the place of the death and applied
the wrongful death law of Texas to a bus accident in Mexico causing
deaths in Mexico. In Clark, however, the deceased persons were Texas
citizens, the bus tickets were sold in Texas, the round trip began in
Texas and it was scheduled to end in Texas. 98 Under these circumstances,
the Texas court found that Texas had the most significant relationship
and applied Texas law both to the U.S. bus company that sold the tickets
and provided transportation in Texas, and to the Mexican bus company
that accepted the passengers for the portion of the ride taking place in
Mexico.9
Despite Clark, the Texas federal court probably would apply Mexican
law to the GrowFast litigation. The parties and events set forth in the
hypothetical problem have far fewer Texas contacts than were present
in Clark. Therefore, the presumption that the law of the place of the
injury will apply'00 is harder to overcome. Moreover, Texas might conclude
that it ought not go out of its way to impose greater liability on a U.S.
corporation in order to enhance recovery for the families of Mexican
nationals when Mexican law would not provide such liberal liability rules
to Mexican nationals. However, one cannot be sure. 01 As the Texas
courts have conceded, there is much room for debate in the application
94. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175, at 522 (1971).
95. Id. at 522-23; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971).
96. Tennimon v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 823 F.2d 68, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1987); Rosenberg
v. Celotex Corp., 767 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1985); Cox v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 665 F.2d
566, 569-71 (5th Cir. 1982).
97. Trailways, Inc. v. Clark, 794 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id. at 486.
100. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (1971).
101. See Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974) (California
applied California's liberal law of damages in wrongful death actions to a California accident in
which Mexican nationals died).
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of the "most significant relationship" test. "There is no set formula for
determining the significance of any particular contact, which must gen-
erally be weighed on a case-by-case basis and balanced against other such
contacts. The trial judge, therefore, should have some latitude in balancing
legitimate competing state interests."' 0 2
B. Products Liability Law
Texas applies the "most significant relationship" test to determine
which state's law of products liability to apply to wrongful death issues.
In Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron,10 3 the Texas federal court had to
determine which products liability applied to a crash in Surinam of a
helicopter manufactured in Texas by defendant, Bell Helicopter Textron.
The crash injured the Canadian pilot who was employed by a Canadian
company and was flying the company's Canadian-regisered he per.
The court first decided that Surinam had no significant relationship to
the events even though the crash occurred there.104 This decision reduced
the alternatives to the law of Canada'05 or of Texas. Texas had the more
liberal products liability law and the Canadian plaintiff sought to have
Texas law apply; the Texas manufacturer wanted Canadian law.'06
The court chose to apply Texas products liability law. The court decided
that Texas adopted a very liberal products liability law in order to assure
full compensation to victims of defective products and that Texas "seeks
to spread the financial burden of injuries suffered by consumers, regardless
of nationality, as widely as possible through the use of liability insurance
or through the treatment of liability costs as business expenses by Texas
concerns."'' 0 The court also found that the liberal strict products liability
doctrine of Texas sought to assure the greatest incentive to Texas com-
panies to make safe products.'08 In contrast, the Texas court decided
that the absence of strict products liability law in Canada was designed
to protect Canadian companies from large judgments./°9 Because the
defendant was from Texas and not Canada, the court concluded that
the Canadian policy of protecting Canadian companies would not be
fostered in a case involving a Texas manufacturer." 0 The court concluded
that application of the Texas choice of law approach "clearly mandates
the use of Texas products liability law."' ' "
The Baird case suggests that if the SollateTM were manufactured in
Texas, the court would probably apply Texas product liability law to
102. Supra note 97 at 485.
103. Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
104. Id. at 1139.
105. Specifically, the court was considering whether to apply the law of British Columbia. Id.
at 1141.
106. Id. at 1140.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1140-41.
109. Id. at 1141.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1141.
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benefit Mexican nationals at the expense of the Texas manufacturer.
However, such solicitude for the well-being of foreign nationals at the
expense of U.S. manufacturers is not inevitable, given the vagaries inherent
in the "most significant relationship" test.
C. Damages Law
The question concerning damages which is posed in the hypothetical
assumes that Mexico's substantive law applies. If the Texas federal court
applied Mexican substantive law, it probably would apply Mexican laws
concerning damages as well, especially if those laws are less favorable
to the foreign nationals than the damage law of Texas.
The Texas choice of law system follows the Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws" 2 which provides that the law of damages normally
should be the same as the substantive law which the court chooses to
apply." 3 Because the hypothetical assumes that the court chose Mexican
substantive law, the Texas choice of law rule probably would point to
Mexican law of damages as well.
In Baird,"4 however, the court did not link the substantive law and
the law of damages despite the Restatement's preference for doing so.
The federal court in Texas applied the liberal products liability law of
Texas to favor a Canadian plaintiff against a Texas defendant but then
applied the restrictive damages law of Canada to limit the amount that
the Canadian plaintiff could recover against the Texas corporation. The
court applied Canadian law capping liability for pain and suffering
damages at $100,000 rather than Texas law containing no limits on the
amount of recovery. The court reasoned that because Canada does not
think it unfair for a Canadian plaintiff to be limited to $100,000 in
damages, Texas should not go out of its way to award more, especially
when the money would come from a Texas corporation: "Texas has no
direct concern about the amount of damages awarded to a Canadian
domiciliary" who "will become no burden on the Texas welfare system"
if he runs out of funds to care for himself because of the cap on liability
under Canadian law." 5 The court also applied Canadian law barring a
right to spousal consortium instead of the Texas law permitting such a
right, despite the fact that the court applied the liberal Texas law of
products liability to resolve the merits of the dispute: "Texas interests
in seeing spouses compensated for loss of consortium are not involved
here because no Texas citizen has been injured. Texas' paternalistic desire
to protect its domiciliary dependents from excessive liability... would be
thwarted if Texas law is applied. ' " 6
112. Guiterrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 171 (damages generally); 178 (wrongful death
damages) (1971).
114. Supra note 103.
115. Id. at 1151.
116. Id. at 1152. It is noteworthy that when the court chose to apply Texas' liberal products
liability law, it did so to give a right to recovery to injured persons "regardless of nationality";
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The rule favoring linkage between the applicable substantive law and
the law of damages favors application of Mexican law of damages. In
Baird, the court broke that link in order to give lower damages to a
foreign national. Nothing in Baird suggests that Texas would break the
linkage in order to provide greater damages to foreign nationals injured
in a foreign country by a product manufactured in Texas. If Mexico's
substantive law is applied, Mexico's law of damages probably will apply
to the foreign nationals who are plaintiffs in the courts in Texas.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF A JUDGMENT FROM MEXICO IN A
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States Constitution provides that the judgments of one
U.S. state are entitled to full faith and credit in every other U.S. state. "7
A Af,.,.,ll st ,,,te ,mp,,,mltnis tf le Full Faith and Credit Clause by providing
that the courts of a second state must honor and enforce the judgments
of a sister state that are presented to it for enforcement. 1 8
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has no application to judgments of
foreign countries because they are not judgments of U.S. states." 9 The
federal government could enter into a treaty agreeing to honor judgments
of foreign countries. 20 If the federal government did so, the states would
be bound to honor the provisions of such a treaty.' 2' There is no treaty
between the United States and Mexico calling for the mandatory rec-
ognition of judgments of Mexico in the United States.'2
Absent compulsion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and absent
a treaty, each state is free to decide for itself whether to honor the
judgments of a foreign country. 23 Furthermore, there is no federal doctrine
of recognition that is applicable in federal courts. Rather, federal courts
asked to recognize the judgments of a foreign country apply the law of
recognition of the state in which the federal court sits.'2
Absent a statute, recognition of foreign country judgments is a function
of the doctrine of "comity." In Hilton v. Guyot,125 the Court ruled that
when a foreign judgment creditor seeks to enforce a foreign country
judgment in a U.S. court, the U.S. court need not give the judgment
the equivalent of full faith and credit if the foreign country would not
Id. at 1140, but in declining to apply Texas' liberal damages law the court concluded that "Texas
has no direct concern about the amount of damages awarded to a Canadian domiciliary." Id. at
1151.
117. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
118. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1994). Some defenses are available to the party opposing the grant of
full faith and credit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 103-121 (1971).
119. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
122. See Rendering and Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Mexico and the United States: A Panel
Discussion, 2 U.S.-MExico L.J. 91, 96-97 (1994).
123. E.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1926).
124. E.g., Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
125. Supra note 119.
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provide equivalent recognition to a U.S. judgment. The requirement of
reciprocity has been relaxed and many states no longer insist that rec-
ognition of foreign judgments will occur only if the foreign country
would honor the judgment of the U.S. state.'2
More than half of the American states have adopted a virtually identical
statute which details when those states will honor the judgments of foreign
countries which order that the defendant pay a money judgment to the
plaintiff.1 27 Texas has adopted this "Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition
Act." t2' The Act creates a general rule that the U.S. state will honor a
final and conclusive judgment of a foreign state for a sum of money
by treating "the foreign judgment. . .in the same manner as the judgment
of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.'( 129
The statute provides three occasions when the foreign country money-
judgment shall not be treated as conclusive despite the general rule.
Judgments for money of a foreign country are not honored when:
1. The foreign country lacks impartial tribunals or procedures com-
patible with U.S. principles of due process of law;
2. The foreign country tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant;
3. The foreign country tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 130
If none of these three disqualifying conditions are present, the U.S.
court has discretion to decline to honor the judgment after consideration
of six additional factors.' The presence of any one of these factors
does not preclude recognition but the court may take them into account
in deciding whether it will exercise its discretion to honor the judgment:
1. The defendant did not get notice of the foreign proceeding in
time to defend;
2. The judgment was obtained by fraud;
3. The claim underlying the foreign judgment is repugnant to the
public policy of the U.S. state;
4. The judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment
of a different court;
5. The parties had agreed that they would resolve the dispute else-
where than in the foreign country court that rendered the judgment;
6. If jurisdiction was based only on personal service upon the de-
fendant, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum.'32
Whether Texas would honor a Mexican judgment in accordance with
the Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act would depend upon the
details of the proceedings in the Mexican court. Whether Delaware or
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, cmt. f (1988 Supp.); see 15A C.J.S. 2D
Conflict of Laws § 5 (1967).
127. Supra note 51.
128. Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-36.008 (West 1986).
129. Supra note 51 at § 3.
130. Id. at § 4(a).
131. Id. at § 4(b).
132. Id.
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Kansas would honor such a Mexican judgment would not depend upon
the terms of the Act because neither state has adopted the Act.'33 Both
states have indicated that they would follow the lead of the United States
Supreme Court opinion in Hilton v. Guyot.13 4 The difference between
the Hilton standard and that of the Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act is not great if the largely discredited requirement of reciprocity3 ' is
no longer applicable. The Kansas court characterized the Hilton approach
as follows: "In applying the principles set out in Hilton, 'courts will
generally recognize the judgments of foreign courts if (1) the foreign
court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the defendant in
the foreign action had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard; (3)
the judgment was not obtained by fraud; and (4) enforcement will not
contravene public policy.'"13 6
V. CONCLUSION
Commerce between Mexico and the United States inevitably will con-
tinue to increase. With more products crossing the border, more inter-
national products liability litigation will occur. Existing doctrines of
jurisdiction, choice of law and enforcement of judgments are too am-
biguous to provide the certainty, predictability and ease of application
which are necessary to foster international business transactions. In the
short run, clever lawyers, adept at the game of forum shopping, will
use the existing rules to gain litigation advantages. In the long run,
Mexico and United States must provide stability through international
agreements.
133. See 13 U.L.A. 63 (West Supp.1995) (list of states adopting the Act).
134. Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 198, 201 (D. Kan. 1993); Bata v. Bata,
163 A.2d 493, 505-06 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961).
135. See 15A C.J.S. 2D, Conflict of Laws § 5 (1967).
136. Phillips, 150 F.R.D. at 201 (citing with approval, South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Westpac
Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D. S.C. 1987)).
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